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Amanda Paul 
 
UN-backed negotiations aimed at reunifying Cyprus after more than four decades are entering their most critical phase.  
The leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, Nicos Anastasiades and Mustafa Akinci will meet in Geneva 
from 9 to 11 January for negotiations aimed at bridging gaps and reaching a compromise on territory. A multilateral 
conference on the security and guarantee issues, with the participation of the three guarantor powers (Greece, Turkey and 
the UK) will follow on 12 January. If an agreement is reached, it will go to public referendum in late spring or early summer 
of 2017. 
 
A solution would bring about a new climate of stability and security on the island and in the Eastern Mediterranean region, 
which is also expected to significantly enhance the Cypriot economy. It would positively affect the relationship between 
Turkey and Greece, as well as EU-Turkey relations, and improve the conditions for much needed regional cooperation. This 
could lead to the exploitation and exporting of hydrocarbons from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe via Turkey. While 
Akinci and Anastasiades have been consistent advocates of reunification on the basis of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation 
throughout their political lives, significant challenges remain, not least reaching an agreement on territorial adjustment and 
security guarantees. It will require both leaders to make courageous and bold decisions and abandon maximalist goals and 
red lines.  
 
Next steps 
 
During the last quarter of 2016, negotiations were intensified with the two leaders reaching agreements and closing the 
gaps on many issues. Some of which, however, such as the rotating presidency, were left to a final ‘give-and-take’ session 
which is expected at the end of the process. A first attempt to reach an agreement on territorial adjustment took place in 
Switzerland in November 2016, but no compromise was reached. Differences over the amount of territory both sides would 
eventually claim and the number of displaced persons (mostly Greek Cypriots) who would be allowed to return to the new 
territories brought the talks to a standstill, representing the most serious setback in 19 months of negotiations. Still, the fact 
that the two leaders committed to a new effort to reach an agreement on territory and a five-party conference demonstrates 
their level of commitment and reinforces the belief that an agreement looks achievable. The international community, 
including the US and the EU, along with Turkey and Greece responded by intensifying diplomatic efforts, including Athens 
and Ankara engaging in frequent communication with each other along with the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The fact that 
neither Greece nor Turkey has placed preconditions on their participation in the multilateral conference is also positive and 
indicative of the talks having reached a crucial juncture.   
 
In Geneva, Anastasiades and Akinci will seek to agree on a boundary between the two future constituent states and the 
return of at least one key area of northern Cyprus to the Greek Cypriots, in addition to the ghost town of Varosha. There is a 
need for a detailed plan for resettlement of the displaced population complete with details, timetable and funding. Maps will 
be exchanged, which was not the case in December. A readjustment of coastal control to reflect population percentage is 
also being discussed. 
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The Greek Cypriot position is that territorial adjustment should result in at least 50% of Greek Cypriot displaced persons 
being able to return home under Greek Cypriot administration. This would allow for some 90,000 displaced persons to 
return and resolve the property problem for that number. The Turkish Cypriot side wishes to minimise the effect of the 
territorial adjustment on the community so that the changes faced by Turkish Cypriots are manageable. Key in the territory 
discussions will be the fate of Morphou/Güzelyurt. While the Greek Cypriots insist that Morphou/Güzelyurt should be 
returned, the Turkish Cypriots presently rule this out. It is possible that the village becomes part of the ‘give-and-take’ 
session possibly in exchange for an agreement on the rotating presidency, which is incredibly important for Akinci to be able 
to sell the deal, given both sides’ commitment to political equality.  
 
Security and guarantees are no less difficult as they also require an agreement by the three guarantor states. The 1960 
Treaty of Guarantee gives unilateral rights of intervention to Turkey, Greece and the UK. Greece and the UK have indicated 
they are ready to give up their guarantor status. The UK has also signalled its readiness to concede half of its total 
sovereign military areas. However, the position of Turkey remains problematic. The Turkish Cypriots insist on a continued 
Turkish military presence, along with the right to unilateral intervention by Turkey, which are both unacceptable for the 
Greek Cypriots. The right to unilateral intervention, even if it were applied only to a future Turkish constituent state, is 
particularly contentious. These positions reflect the historical legacy of the conflict. While there has been no violence on 
Cyprus for decades, psychological scars remain. Turkish Cypriots do not trust the Greek Cypriots, while the Greek Cypriots 
do not trust Ankara; it will take time to turn this around. On the subject of military presence there seems to be room for 
flexibility, although the majority of the current 35-40,000 Turkish troops in the north should leave almost immediately. 
Creative options are also being discussed for guarantees, including a transitional option which could be reviewed  
after a certain length of time, along with changing the wording from guarantees to something else, such as security and 
defence cooperation. 
 
Selling the deal  
 
Yet even if a deal is secured and endorsed by the two leaders along with Greece and Turkey, this does not guarantee 
success as it requires popular support. An eventual compromise must be viewed as a win-win by both communities. In the 
run-up to Geneva, hardliners on both sides of the island intensified their efforts to turn people against a solution. To help 
counter propaganda and disinformation campaigns the two leaders have agreed to travel the island together to sell and 
explain the deal, which could prove vital to secure the necessary support from both communities.   
 
With an estimated cost of €25-€40 billion, how the implementation of the deal will be financed also needs to be clarified. 
Those Cypriots who are due to receive compensation for property and/or territory will expect to see evidence that financing 
exists before they vote. Commitments voiced by the EU, along with the IMF and World Bank should be firmed up sooner 
rather than later. Moreover, the EU could also finance a tailored programme for Cyprus similar to the EU funded Northern 
Ireland PEACE initiative – aimed at supporting projects and operations which help reconcile communities and contribute 
towards sustainable peace. 
 
Anastasiades and Akinci have gone further than anyone else in the process of reaching an agreement. Still, the last mile is 
always the most difficult one in peace processes. However, if the talks fail Cyprus would enter uncharted waters as most 
observers believe that this is the last realistic chance to reunite the island. 
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